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Abstract
& There are two competing theories of facial expression
recognition. Some researchers have suggested that it is an
example of ‘‘categorical perception.’’ In this view, expression
categories are considered to be discrete entities with sharp
boundaries, and discrimination of nearby pairs of expressive
faces is enhanced near those boundaries. Other researchers,
however, suggest that facial expression perception is more
graded and that facial expressions are best thought of as points
in a continuous, low-dimensional space, where, for instance,
‘‘surprise’’ expressions lie between ‘‘happiness’’ and ‘‘fear’’
expressions due to their perceptual similarity. In this article,
we show that a simple yet biologically plausible neural network
model, trained to classify facial expressions into six basic
emotions, predicts data used to support both of these
theories. Without any parameter tuning, the model matches
a variety of psychological data on categorization, similarity,
reaction times, discrimination, and recognition difficulty, both
qualitatively and quantitatively. We thus explain many of the
seemingly complex psychological phenomena related to facial
expression perception as natural consequences of the tasks’
implementations in the brain. &
INTRODUCTION
How do we see emotions in facial expressions? Are they
perceived as discrete entities, like islands jutting out of
the sea, or are they more continuous, reflecting the
structure beneath the surface? We believe that computa-
tional models of the process can shed light on these
questions. Automatic facial expression analysis is an
active area of computer vision research (Lien, Kanade,
Cohn, & Li, 2000; Donato, Bartlett, Hager, Ekman, &
Sejnowski, 1999; Lyons, Budynek, & Akamatsu, 1999;
Rosenblum, Yacoob, & Davis, 1996). However, there has
only been limited work in applying computational mod-
els to the understanding of human facial expression
processing (Calder, Burton, Miller, Young, & Akamatsu,
2001; Lyons, Akamatsu, Kamachi, & Gyoba, 1998). In
particular, the relationship between categorization and
perception is controversial, and a computational model
may help elucidate the connection between them.
Basic Emotions and Discrete Facial Expression
Categories
Although the details of his theory have evolved substan-
tially since the 1960s, Ekman remains the most vocal
proponent of the idea that emotions are discrete entities.
In a recent essay, he outlined his theory of basic emo-
tions and their relationship with facial expressions
(Ekman, 1999). ‘‘Basic’’ emotions are distinct families of
affective states characterized by different signals, physi-
ology, appraisal mechanisms, and antecedent events.
Ekman cites early evidence suggesting that each emotion
is accompanied by distinctive physiological changes that
prepare an organism to respond appropriately. For in-
stance, blood flow to the hands increases during anger,
possibly in preparation for a fight. In addition to physio-
logical changes, according to the theory, each basic
emotion family is also accompanied by a fast appraisal
mechanism that attends to relevant stimuli and a set of
universal antecedent events (e.g., physical or psycholog-
ical harm normally leads to a state of fear, and loss of a
significant other normally leads to a state of sadness).
Finally, and most importantly, Ekman believes that emo-
tions evolved to ‘‘inform conspecifics, without choice or
consideration, about what is occurring: inside the per-
son . . . , what most likely occurred . . . , and what is most
likely to occur next’’ (p. 47). Thus, every basic emotion
family is necessarily accompanied by one (or perhaps a
few for some families) distinctive prototypical signals,
including a set of facial muscle movements and body
movements (e.g., approach or withdrawal). The signals
are not entirely automatic; they may be attenuated,
masked, or faked in certain circumstances. Further-
more, within emotion families, individual differences
and situational context allow for small variations on
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the emotion’s theme. But between families, the physi-
ology, appraisal mechanisms, antecedents, and signals
differ in fundamental ways. Based on these criteria,
Ekman proposes that there are 15 basic emotion fami-
lies: amusement, anger, contempt, contentment, dis-
gust, embarrassment, excitement, fear, guilt, pride in
achievement, relief, sadness/distress, satisfaction, sen-
sory pleasure, and shame. The two crucial components
of the theory, which distinguish it from other theorists’
approaches, are that emotions are fundamentally sepa-
rate from one another and that they evolved to help
organisms deal with fundamental life tasks.
On this view, since emotions are distinct, and each
emotion family is accompanied by a small set of dis-
tinctive signals (facial expressions), we might expect
subjects’ facial expression categorization behavior to
exhibit the characteristics of discrete, clear-cut deci-
sions, not smooth, graded, fuzzy categorization. Evi-
dence that facial expressions are perceived as discrete
entities, then, would be further evidence for the theory
of basic emotions and a deterministic expression/emo-
tion mapping. Indeed, evidence of ‘‘categorical percep-
tion’’ (CP) of facial expressions has recently emerged in
the literature.
In some domains, it appears that sensory systems
adapt to impose discontinuous category boundaries in
continuous stimulus spaces. For instance, in a rainbow,
we perceive bands of discrete colors even though the
light’s wavelength varies smoothly. In psychophysical
experiments, subjects have difficulty discriminating
between two shades of green differing by a small con-
stant wavelength distance, but find it easier to distin-
guish between two stimuli the same distance apart but
closer to the green/yellow boundary. This phenomenon
is called ‘‘categorical perception’’ (Harnad, 1987). It also
occurs in auditory perception of phonemes. When we
listen to utterances varying continuously from a /ba/
sound to a /pa/ sound, we perceive a sudden shift from
/ba/ to /pa/, not a mixture of the two. As with colors, we
can also discriminate pairs of equidistant phonemes
better when they are closer to the perceived /ba/–/pa/
boundary. In general, CP is assessed operationally in
terms of two behavioral measures, categorization judg-
ments and discrimination (same/different) judgments.
Categorization measures typically use a forced-choice
task, for example, selection of the /ba/ category or the
/pa/ category. The stimuli are randomly sampled from
smoothly varying continua such as a step-by-step tran-
sition between /ba/ and /pa/ prototypes. Even though
subjects are not told that the data come from such
continua, they nevertheless label all stimuli on one side
of some boundary as /ba/, and all stimuli on the other
side as /pa/, suggesting a sharp category boundary. For
the second behavioral measure of CP, discrimination,
subjects are asked to make a ‘‘same/different’’ response
to a pair of stimuli that are nearby on the continuum
(simultaneous discrimination), or perform a sequential
(ABX) discrimination task in which stimulus ‘‘A’’ is
shown, stimulus ‘‘B’’ is shown, then either ‘‘A’’ or ‘‘B’’
is shown and subjects are asked which of the first two
stimuli the third matches. For categorically perceived
stimuli, subjects show better discrimination when the
two stimuli are near the category boundary defined by
their labeling behavior, compared with two stimuli
further from the boundary.
In some cases, such as the color example, CP is
thought to be an innate property of the perceptual
system. But in other cases, perceptual discontinuities
at category boundaries are clearly acquired through
learning. For instance, Beale and Keil (1995) created
morph sequences between pairs of famous faces (e.g.,
Clinton–Kennedy) and unfamiliar faces then had sub-
jects discriminate or categorize neighboring pairs of
faces along the morph sequence. They found that
famous face pairs exhibited category effects (increased
discrimination near the boundaries), but unfamiliar face
pairs did not. Their result showed that CP can be
acquired through learning and is not limited to low-level
perceptual stimuli.
Etcoff and Magee (1992) were the first to raise the
question of whether the perceptual mechanisms respon-
sible for facial expression recognition are actually tuned
to emotion categories, or whether perception is contin-
uous, with category membership ‘‘assigned by higher
conceptual and linguistic systems’’ (p. 229). The authors
created caricatures (line drawings) of the Ekman and
Friesen (1976) photos and 10-step morphs between pairs
of those caricatures. They included happy–sad, angry–
sad, and angry–afraid continua as easily discriminated
category pairs. Surprised–afraid and angry–disgusted
continua were included as less easily discriminated pairs.
Happy–neutral and sad–neutral continua were included
to test for category boundaries along the dimension of
presence or nonpresence of an emotion, and finally,
happy–surprised continua were added to include a
transition between positive emotions. The authors found
that all expressions except surprise were perceived cat-
egorically: In an ABX task, morph pairs straddling the
50% category boundary were significantly better discri-
minated than those closer to the prototypes, and in an
identification task, subjects placed sharp boundaries
between categories, with significantly nonlinear category
membership functions. Etcoff and Magee interpreted
these results as evidence for mandatory category assign-
ment: ‘‘people cannot help but see the face as showing
one or another kind of emotion’’ (p. 229). Their results
therefore pose a serious challenge for advocates of
a continuous space of emotions and rough emotion
expression correspondence.
Etcoff and Magee’s (1992) provocative results led to
further research exploring CP in facial expression rec-
ognition. Some of the potential limitations of their
study were that the stimuli were line drawings, not
image-quality faces, that each subject was only exposed
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to a single continuum, and that the discrimination
results, being from a sequential (ABX) task, might
reflect a short-term memory phenomenon rather than
a perceptual phenomenon. In view of these limitations,
Calder, Young, Perrett, Etcoff, and Rowland (1996)
extended and replicated the earlier experiments with
image-quality morphs. They produced several continua
using the Ekman and Friesen (1976) photos (e.g.,
Ekman and Friesen prototypes and image-quality morph
sequences produced in R. A.’s lab, see Figure 1). The
authors first replicated Etcoff and Magee’s experiments
with new stimuli: image-quality happy–sad, angry–sad,
and angry–afraid sequences, each using a different
actor. A second experiment followed the same proce-
dure except that each subject’s stimuli included morphs
from four different actors. In a third experiment, they
had subjects categorize stimuli from three different
expression continua employing a single actor (‘‘J. J.’’
afraid–happy, happy–angry, and angry–afraid sequen-
ces). Finally, they had subjects perform a simultaneous
discrimination (same/different) task. In the second
experiment, for the happy–sad transitions, the authors
found that artifacts in morphing between a face with
teeth and one without (a ‘‘graying’’ of the teeth as the
morph moves away from the happy prototype) helped
subjects in the discrimination task. However, on the
whole, the results were consistent with CP: sharp
category boundaries and enhanced discrimination near
the boundaries, regardless of whether there was a single
or several continua present in the experiment and
regardless of whether the sequential or simultaneous
discrimination task was used.
In the psychological literature on categorization, CP
effects are usually taken as evidence that (1) object
representations are altered during the course of cat-
egory learning, or (2) that subjects automatically label
stimuli even when they are making a purely perceptual
discrimination (Goldstone, 2000; Goldstone, Lippa, &
Shiffrin, 2001; Pevtzow & Harnad, 1997; Tijsseling &
Harnad, 1997). Findings of CP effects in facial expres-
sion stimuli raise the possibility that perception of facial
expressions is discrete in the same way that category
labeling is. Calder et al.’s experiments strengthened the
argument for CP of facial expressions, but the authors
shy away from Etcoff and Magee’s strong interpretation
that facial expression category assignment is man-
datory. They propose instead that perhaps CP is
‘‘an emergent property of population coding in the
nervous system’’ occurring whenever ‘‘populations of
cells become tuned to distinct categories’’(p. 116). In
this article, we will show precisely how this can occur,
suggesting that Calder et al.’s hypothesis may indeed
be correct.
Continuous Emotion Space and Fuzzy Facial
Expression Categories
Other theorists hold that the relationship between
emotions and facial expressions is not so categorical,
discrete, or deterministic as the theory of basic emotions
and the evidence for CP suggest. The notion that facial
expression perception is discrete is challenged by data
showing that similarity judgments of these expressions
exhibit a graded, continuous structure.
Schlosberg (1952), following up on the work of his
advisor (Woodworth, 1938), found that emotion cate-
gory ratings and subjects’ ‘‘errors’’ (e.g., the likelihood of
their labeling a putatively disgusted expression as con-
tempt) could be predicted fairly accurately by arranging
the emotion categories around an ellipse whose major
Figure 1. (a) Example proto-
typical expressions of six basic
emotions and a neutral face for
actor ‘‘J. J.’’ in Ekman and
Friesen’s POFA (Ekman &
Friesen, 1976). (b) Morphs
from fear to sadness and
happiness to disgust, generated
from the corresponding
prototypes.
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axis was pleasantness versus unpleasantness (exemplified
by happy and sad expressions) and whose minor axis
was attention versus rejection (exemplified by surprise
and disgust expressions).
More recently, Russell (1980) proposed a structural
theory of emotion concepts with two dimensions,
pleasure and arousal. Russell and Bullock (1986) then
proposed that emotion categories are best thought of
as fuzzy sets. A few facial expressions might have a
membership of 1.0 (100%) in one particular category,
and others might have intermediate degrees of mem-
bership in more than one category. On their view, the
facial expression confusion data supporting structural
theories like Schlosberg’s (1952) reflected the overlap
of these fuzzy categories. To test this concept, Russell
and Bullock had subjects rate a variety of facial expres-
sions for how well they exemplify categories like
‘‘excited,’’ ‘‘happy,’’ ‘‘sleepy,’’ ‘‘mad,’’ and so forth. They
found that the categories did indeed overlap, with peak
levels of membership for Ekman’s basic emotion cate-
gories occurring at Ekman’s prototypical expressions. A
similarity structure analysis (multidimensional scaling
[MDS]—see Figure 9 for an example) performed on
the subjects’ ratings produced two dimensions highly
correlated with other subjects’ pleasure and arousal
ratings. When asked to verify (yes or no) membership
of facial expression stimuli in various emotion concept
categories, there was a high level of consensus for
prototypical expressions and less consensus for boun-
dary cases. Asking subjects to choose exemplars for a
set of categories also revealed graded membership
functions for the categories. The data thus showed that
facial expression categories have systematically graded
overlapping membership in various emotion categories.
On the basis of this evidence, Russell and Bullock
proposed that facial expression interpretation first
involves appraising the expression in terms of pleasure
and arousal. Then the interpreter may optionally
choose a label for the expression. Following Schlosberg,
they proposed that finer, more confident judgments
require contextual information.
This and additional recent research (Schiano, Ehrlich,
Sheridan, & Beck, 2000; Katsikitis, 1997; Carroll &
Russell, 1996; Russell, 1980; Russell, Lewicka, & Niit,
1989) suggests that there is a continuous, multidimen-
sional perceptual space underlying facial expression
perception in which some expression categories are
more similar to each other than others.
Young et al.’s (1997) ‘‘Megamix’’ Experiments
Young et al. (1997) set out to further test the predic-
tions of multidimensional and categorical accounts of
facial expression perception and recognition. They
pointed out that 2-D structural theories like Schlos-
berg’s or Russell’s predict that some morph transitions
between expression pairs should pass near other
categories. For instance, if the 2-D representation in
Figure 9a adequately characterizes our perception of
emotional facial expression stimuli, the midpoint of a
morph between happiness and fear should be perceived
as a surprised expression. Categorical views of emo-
tional facial expressions, on the other hand, do not
necessarily predict confusion along morph transitions;
one would expect either sharp transitions between all
pairs of categories or perhaps indeterminate regions
between categories where no emotion is perceived.
Furthermore, if the categorical view is correct, we might
expect CP, in which subjects find it difficult to discrim-
inate between members of the category and easy to
discriminate pairs of stimuli near category boundaries,
as found in previous studies (Calder et al., 1996; Etcoff
& Magee, 1992). To test these contrasting predictions
with an exhaustive set of expression transitions, Young
et al. constructed image-quality morph sequences
between all pairs of the emotional expression proto-
types shown in Figure 1a. (Figure 1b shows example
morph sequences produced in R. A.’s lab.)
In Experiment 1, the authors had subjects identify the
emotion category in 10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, and 90%
morphs between all pairs of the six prototypical expres-
sions in Figure 1a. The stimuli were presented in
random order, and subjects were asked to perform a
six-way forced-choice identification. Experiment 2 was
identical except that morphs between the emotional
expressions and the neutral prototype were added to
the pool, and ‘‘neutral’’ was one of the subjects’ choices
in a seven-way forced-choice procedure. The results of
Experiment 2 for 6 of the 21 possible transitions are
reprinted in Figure 2. In both experiments, along every
morph transition, subjects’ modal response to the stim-
uli abruptly shifted from one emotion to the other with
no indeterminate regions or between. Consistent with
categorical theories of facial expressions, the subjects’
modal response was always one of the endpoints of the
morph sequence, never a nearby category. Subjects’
response times (RTs), however, were more consistent
with a multidimensional or weak category account of
facial expression perception: As distance from the pro-
totypes increased, RTs increased significantly, presum-
ably reflecting increased uncertainty about category
membership near category boundaries.
In Experiment 3, Young et al. explored the extent to
which subjects could discriminate pairs of stimuli along
the six transitions: happiness–surprise, surprise–fear,
fear–sadness, sadness–disgust, disgust–anger, anger–
happiness. They had subjects do both a sequential
discrimination task (ABX) and a simultaneous discrim-
ination task (same – different). Only the data from
the sequential experiments are now available, but the
authors report a very strong correlation between the two
types of data (r = .82). The sequential data are reprinted
in Figure 3. The main finding of the experiment was
that subjects had significantly better discrimination
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performance near the category boundaries than near the
expression prototypes, a necessary condition to claim
CP. Experiment 3 therefore best supports the categorical
view of facial expression perception.
Finally, in Experiment 4, Young et al. set out to
determine whether subjects could determine what
expression is ‘‘mixed-in’’ to a faint morph. Again, a
strong categorical view of facial expressions would pre-
dict that subjects should not be able to discern what
expression a given morph sequence is moving toward
until the sequence gets near the category boundary.
However, according to continuous theories, subjects
should be able to determine what prototype a sequence
is moving toward fairly early in the sequence. In the
experiment, subjects were asked to decide, given a
morph or prototype stimulus, the most apparent emo-
tion, the second-most apparent emotion, and the third-
most apparent emotion, using a button box with a
button for each of the six emotion categories. After
correcting for intrinsic confusability of the emotion
categories, the authors found that subjects were sig-
nificantly above chance at detecting the mixed-in emo-
tion at the 30% level. As opposed to the identification
and discrimination data from Experiments 1–3, this
result best supports continuous, dimensional accounts
of facial expression perception.
In summary, Young et al.’s experiments, rather than
settling the issue of categorical versus continuous the-
ories of facial expression perception, found evidence
supporting both types of theory. The authors argue
that a 2-D account of facial expression perception is
unable to account for all of the data, but they also
argue that the strong mandatory categorization view is
likewise deficient.
Figure 2. Selected results of
Young et al.’s (1997) Experi-
ment 2. (a) Human responses
(% identification in a seven-way
forced-choice task) to six
morph sequences: happy –
surprised, surprised– afraid,
afraid–sad, sad– disgusted,
disgusted– angry, and angry–
happy. Every transition exhib-
ited a sharp category boundary.
(b) Modeling subjects’ choice as
a random variable distributed
according to the pattern of
activation at the network’s out-
put layer, which entails aver-
aging across the 13 networks’
outputs. The model has a cor-
relation (over all 15 transitions)
of r = .942 with the human
subjects. (c) RTs for the same
transitions in (a). RTs increased
significantly with distance from
the prototype. (M = sad; only 6
out of 21 possible transitions
are shown). (d) Predictions of
network ‘‘uncertainty’’ model
for the same morph transitions.
1162 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 14, Number 8
Until now, despite several years of research on auto-
matic recognition of facial expressions, no computation-
al model has been shown to simultaneously explain all
of these seemingly contradictory data. In the next sec-
tion, we review the recent progress in computational
modeling of facial expression recognition, then intro-
duce a new model that does succeed in explaining the
available data.
Computational Modeling of Facial Expression
Recognition
Padgett and colleagues were the first to apply computa-
tional models toward an understanding of facial expres-
sion perception (Cottrell, Dailey, Padgett, & Adolphs,
2000; Padgett, Cottrell, & Adolphs, 1996; Padgett &
Cottrell, 1998). Their system employed linear filtering
of regions around the eyes and mouth followed by a
multilayer perception for classification into emotion
categories. The system achieved good recognition per-
formance and was able to explain some of the results on
CP of facial expressions with linear ‘‘dissolve’’ sequen-
ces. However, the system was unable to account for the
sharp category boundaries humans place along image-
quality morph transitions, because the linear filters’
responses varied too quickly in the presence of the
nonlinear changes in morph transitions. It also would
have been incapable of predicting recently observed
evidence of holistic effects in facial expression recogni-
tion (Calder, Young, Keane, & Dean, 2000).
Lyons et al. (1998) created a database of Japanese
female models portraying facial expressions of happi-
ness, surprise, fear, anger, sadness, and disgust. They
then had subjects rate the degree to which each face
portrayed each basic emotion on a 1–5 scale, and used
Euclidean distance between the resulting ‘‘semantic
rating’’ vectors for each face pair as a measure of
dissimilarity. They then used a system inspired by the
Dynamic Link Architecture (Lades et al., 1993) to explain
the human similarity matrix. Similarities obtained from
their Gabor wavelet-based representation of faces were
highly correlated with similarities obtained from the
human data, and nonmetric multidimensional scaling
(MDS) revealed similar underlying 2-D configurations
of the stimuli. The authors suggest in conclusion that
the high-level circumplex constructs proposed by
authors like Schlosberg and Russell may in part reflect
similarity at low levels in the visual system.
In a recent work, Calder et al. (2001) applied a
different computational model to the task of under-
standing human facial expression perception and rec-
ognition. The idea of their system, originally proposed
by Craw and Cameron (1991), is to first encode the
positions of facial features relative to the average face
then warp each face to the average shape (thus pre-
serving texture but removing between-subject face
shape variations). The shape information (the positions
of the facial features prior to warping) and the shape-
free information (the pixel values after warping) can
each be submitted to a separate principal components
analysis (PCA) for linear dimensionality reduction, pro-
ducing separate low-dimensional descriptions of the
face’s shape and texture. Models based on this
approach have been successful in explaining psycholog-
ical effects in face recognition (Hancock, Burton, &
Bruce, 1996, 1998). However, warping the features in
an expressive face to the average face shape would
seem to destroy some of the information crucial to
recognition of that expression, so prior to Calder
et al.’s work, it was an open question as to whether
such a system could support effective classification of
facial expressions. The authors applied the Craw and
Cameron PCA method to Ekman and Friesen’s (1976)
Pictures of Facial Affect (POFA) then used linear dis-
criminant analysis to classify the faces into happy, sad,
afraid, angry, surprised, and disgusted categories. The
authors found that a representation incorporating both
the shape information (feature location PCA) and the
shape-free information (warped pixel PCA) best sup-
ported facial expression classification (83% accuracy
Figure 3. Results of Young
et al.’s (1997) Experiment 3 for
the sequential (ABX) discrimi-
nation task. Each point repre-
sents the percentage of time
subjects correctly discriminated
between two neighboring
morph stimuli. The x-axis labels
denote which pair of stimuli
were being compared (e.g.,
70/90 along the transition from
sadness to disgust denotes a
comparison of a 70% disgust /
30% sadness morph with a 90%
disgust /10% sadness morph).
Discrimination was significantly
better near the prototypes than
near the category boundaries.
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using leave-one-image-out classification for the Ekman
and Friesen database). The authors went on to compare
their system with human data from psychological exper-
iments. They found that their system behaved similarly
to humans in a seven-way forced-choice task and that
the principal component representation could be used
to predict human ratings of pleasure and arousal (the
two dimensions of Russell’s circumplex).
Taken together, results with the above three compu-
tational models of facial expression recognition begin to
hint that subjects’ performance in psychological experi-
ments can be explained as a simple consequence of
category learning and the statistical properties of the
stimuli themselves. Although Calder et al.’s system
exhibits a surprising amount of similarity to human
performance in a forced-choice experiment, it has
not been brought to bear in the debate on multi-
dimensional versus CP of facial expressions. In the
present article, we show that a new, more biologically
plausible computational model not only exhibits more
similarity to human forced-choice performance, but
also provides a detailed computational account of data
supporting both categorical and multidimensional the-
ories of facial expression recognition and perception.
Our simulations consist of constructing and training a
simple neural network model (Figure 4); the system
uses the same stimuli employed in many psychological
experiments, performs many of the same tasks, and
can be measured in similar ways as human subjects.
The model consists of three levels of processing:
perceptual analysis, object representation, and catego-
rization. The next section describes the model in
some detail.
The Model
The system is a feed-forward network consisting of three
layers common to most object recognition models
(Riesenhuber & Poggio, 2000). Its input is a 240 by
292 manually aligned, grayscale face image from Ekman
and Friesen’s POFA (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). This data
set contains photos of 14 actors portraying expressions
that are reliably classified as happy, sad, afraid, angry,
surprised, or disgusted by naive observers (70% agree-
ment was the threshold for inclusion in the data set,
and the overall agreement is 91.6%). The expressions
made by one of those actors, ‘‘J. J.,’’ are shown in
Figure 1a. The strong agreement across human sub-
jects, together with the use of these photos in a wide
variety of psychological experiments exploring emo-
tional expression perception, makes POFA an ideal
training set for our model.
The first layer of the model is a set of neurons whose
response properties are similar to those of complex cells
in the visual cortex. The so-called Gabor filter (Daug-
man, 1985) is a standard way to model complex cells in
visual recognition systems (Lades et al., 1993). Figure 5
shows the spatial ‘‘receptive fields’’ of several filters. The
units essentially perform nonlinear edge detection at
five scales and eight orientations. As a feature detector,
the Gabor filter has the advantage of moderate trans-
lation invariance over pixel-based representations. This
means that features can ‘‘move’’ in the receptive field
without dramatically affecting the detector’s response,
making the first layer of our model robust to small image
changes. With a 29 by 35 grid and 40 filters at each grid
location, we obtain 40,600 model neurons in this layer,
which we term the ‘‘perceptual’’ layer.
In order to extract a small set of informative features
from this high-dimensional data, we use the equivalent
of an ‘‘image compression’’ network (Cottrell, Munro, &
Zipser, 1989). This is a back propagation network that is
trained to simply reproduce its input on its output
through a narrow channel of hidden units. In order to
solve this problem, the hidden units must extract regu-
larities from the data. Since they are fully connected to
the inputs, they usually extract global representations
we have termed ‘‘holons’’ in previous work (Cottrell &
Metcalfe, 1991). We note that this is a biologically
plausible means of dimensionality reduction in the sense
that it is unsupervised and can be learned by simple
networks employing Hebbian learning rules (Sanger,
1989). As a shortcut, we compute this network’s weights
Figure 5. Example Gabor
filters. The real (cosine shaped)
component is shown relative to
the size of the face at all five
scales and five of the eight
orientations used.
Figure 4. Model schematic.
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directly via the equivalent statistical technique of PCA.
We chose 50 principal components (hidden units) for
this layer based on previous experiments showing this
leads to good generalization on POFA. It is important to
note that the number of components (the only free
parameter in our system) was not tuned to human data.
The resulting low-dimensional object-level representa-
tion is specific to the facial expression and identity
variations in its input, as is the population of so-called
face cells in the inferior temporal cortex (Perrett, Hieta-
nen, Oram, & Benson, 1992). We term this layer of
processing the ‘‘gestalt’’ level.
Although PCA is one of the simplest and most
efficient methods for coding a set of stimuli, other
methods would probably also work. For the current
model, it is only important that (1) the code be
sensitive to the dimensions of variance in faces, to
facilitate learning of expressions, and that (2) the code
be low dimensional, to facilitate generalization to novel
faces. In a more general object recognition system, a
single PCA for all kinds of objects would probably not
be appropriate, because the resulting code would not
be sparse (a single image normally activates a large
number of holistic ‘‘units’’ in a PCA representation, but
object-sensitive cells in the visual system appear to
respond much more selectively; Logothetis & Shein-
berg, 1996). To obtain a good code for a large number
of different objects, then, nonnegative matrix factoriza-
tion (Lee & Seung, 1999) or an independent compo-
nent mixture model (Lee, Lewicki, & Sejnowski, 2000)
might be more appropriate. For the current problem,
though, PCA suffices.
The outputs of the gestalt layer are finally categorized
into the six ‘‘basic’’ emotions by a simple perceptron
with six outputs, one for each emotion. The network is
set up so that its outputs can be interpreted as proba-
bilities (they are all positive and sum to 1). However, the
system is trained with an ‘‘all-or-none’’ teaching signal.
That is, even though only 92% (say) of the human
subjects used to vet the POFA database may have
responded ‘‘happy’’ to a particular face, the network’s
teaching signal is 1 for the ‘‘happy’’ unit, and 0 for the
other five. Thus, the network does not have available
to it the confusions that subjects make on the data.
We term this layer the ‘‘category’’ level.
While this categorization layer is an extremely simplis-
tic model of human category learning and decision-
making processes, we argue that the particular form of
classifier is unimportant; so long as it is sufficiently
powerful and reliable to place the gestalt-level represen-
tations into emotion categories, we claim that similar
results will obtain with any nonlinear classifier.
We should also point out that the system abstracts
away many important aspects of visual processing in
the brain, such as eye movements, facial expression
dynamics, size, and viewpoint invariance. These com-
plicating factors turn out to be irrelevant for our
purposes; as we shall see, despite the simplifying
assumptions of the model, it nevertheless accounts
for a wide variety of data available from controlled
behavioral experiments. This suggests that it is a good
first-order approximation of processing at the computa-
tional level in the visual system.
The next section reports on the results of several
experiments comparing the model’s predictions to
human data from identical tasks, with special emphasis
on Young et al.’s landmark study of categorical effects in
facial expression perception (Young et al., 1997). We
find (1) that the model and humans find the same
expressions difficult or easy to interpret; (2) that when
presented with morphs between pairs of expressions,
the model and humans place similar sharp category
boundaries between the prototypes; (3) that pairwise
similarity ratings derived from the model’s gestalt-level
representations predict human discrimination ability; (4)
that the model and humans are similarly sensitive to
mixed-in expressions in morph stimuli; and (5) that MDS
analysis produces a similar emotional similarity structure
from the model and human data.
RESULTS
Comparison of Model and Human Performance
The connections in the model’s final layer were trained
to classify images of facial expressions from Ekman and
Friesen’s POFA database (see Figure 1a) (Ekman &
Friesen, 1976), the standard data set used in the vast
majority of psychological research on facial expression
(see Methods for details). The training signal contained
no information aside from the expression most agreed
upon by human observers—that is, even if 90% of
human observers labeled a particular face ‘‘happy’’
and 10% labeled it ‘‘surprised,’’ the network was trained
as if 100% had said ‘‘happy.’’ Again, there is no infor-
mation in the training signal concerning the similarity of
different expression categories. The first measurement
we made was the model’s ability to generalize in classi-
fying the expressions of previously unseen subjects from
the same database. The model’s mean generalization
performance was 90.0%, which is not significantly differ-
ent from human performance on the same stimuli
(91.6%; t = .587, df = 190, p = .279) (Table 1). More-
over, the rank-order correlation between the model’s
average accuracy on each category (happiness, surprise,
fear, etc.), and the level of human agreement on the
same categories was .667 (two-tailed Kendall’s tau,
p = .044; cf. Table 1). For example, both the model
and humans found happy faces easy and fear faces the
most difficult to categorize correctly.1 Since the network
had about as much experience with one category as
another, and was not trained on the human response
accuracies, this correlation between the relative difficul-
ties of each category is an ‘‘emergent’’ property of the
Dailey et al. 1165
model. Studies of expression recognition consistently
find that fear is one of the most difficult expressions to
recognize (Katsikitis, 1997; Matsumoto, 1992; Ekman &
Friesen, 1976). Our model suggests that this is simply
because the fear expression is ‘‘inherently’’ difficult to
distinguish from the other five expressions.
How does the network perform the expression rec-
ognition task? An examination of the trained network’s
representation provides some insight. We projected
each unit’s weight vector back into image space in order
to visualize the ‘‘ideal’’ stimulus for each unit in the
network (see Methods for details). The results are
shown in Figure 6, with and without addition of the
average face. In each of the images, each pixel value is
the result of applying a regression formula predicting
the value of the pixel at that location as a linear function
of the 50-element weight vector for the given network
output unit. Dark and bright spots indicate the features
that excite or inhibit a given output unit depending on
the relative gray values in the region of that feature.
Each unit appears to combine evidence for an emotion
based upon the presence or absence of a few local
features. For instance, for fear, the salient criteria appear
to be the eyebrow raise and the eyelid raise, with a
smaller contribution of parted lips. The anger unit
apparently requires a display in which the eyebrows
are not raised. Clearly, the classifier has determined
which feature configurations reliably distinguish each
expression from the others.
Comparison on CP Data
Several studies have reported CP of facial expressions
using morphs between portrayals of the six basic emo-
tions by POFA actor ‘‘J. J.,’’ whose images have been
chosen because his expressions are among the easiest to
recognize in the database (Young et al., 1997; Calder
et al., 1996). Since our model also finds J. J. ‘‘easy’’
(it achieves 100% generalization accuracy on J. J.’s pro-
totypical expressions), we replicated these studies with
13 networks that had not been trained on J. J.2
We first compared the model’s performance with
human data from a six-way forced-choice experiment
(Young et al., 1997), on 10%, 30%,50%, 70%, and 90%
morphs we constructed (see Methods) between all
pairs of J. J.’s prototypical expressions (see Figure 1b
for two such morph sequences). We modeled the
subjects’ identification choices by letting the outputs
of the networks represent the probability mass function
for the human subjects’ responses. This means that we
averaged each of the six outputs of the 13 networks for
each face and compared these numbers to the human
subjects’ response probabilities. Figure 2 compares the
networks’ forced-choice identification performance
with that of humans on the same stimuli. Quantita-
tively, the model’s responses were highly correlated
with the human data (r = .942, p < .001), and
qualitatively, the model maintained the essential fea-
tures of the human data: abrupt shifts in classification
at emotion category boundaries, and few intrusions
(identifications of unrelated expressions) along the
transitions. Using the same criteria for an intrusion
that Young et al. (1997) used, the model predicted 4
intrusions in the 15 morph sequences, compared to 2
out of 15 in the human data. Every one of the
intrusions predicted by the model involved fear, which














Network generalization to unseen faces, compared with human
agreement on the same faces (six-way forced choice). Human data
are provided with the POFA database (Ekman & Friesen, 1976).
Figure 6. Network representa-
tion of each facial expression.
(Top row) Approximation of
the optimal input-level stimulus
for each facial expression
category. (Bottom row) The
same approximations with the
average face subtracted—dark
and bright pixels indicate
salient features.
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is the least reliably classified expression in the POFA
database, for humans and networks (Table 1).
We also compared subjects’ RTs to those of the net-
work, in which we model RT as being proportional to
uncertainty at the category level. That is, if the network
outputs a probability of .9 for happiness, we assume it is
more certain and therefore faster than when it outputs a
probability of .6 for happiness. We thus use the differ-
ence between 1 (the maximum possible output) and the
largest actual output as our model of the reaction time.
As explained earlier, subjects’ RTs exhibit a characteristic
scalloped shape, with slower RTs near category bounda-
ries. The model also exhibits this pattern, as shown in
Figure 2. The reason should be obvious: As a sequence
of stimuli approaches a category boundary, the net-
work’s output for one category necessarily decreases
as the other increases. This results in a longer model RT.
The model showed good correlation with human RTs
(see Methods) (r = .677, p < .001).
The model also provides insight into human discrim-
ination behavior. How can a model that processes one
face at a time discriminate faces? The idea is to imagine
that the model is shown one face at a time and stores its
representation of each face for comparison. We use the
correlation (Pearson’s r) between representations as a
measure of similarity, and then use 1 minus this number
as a measure of discriminability. An interesting aspect of
our model is that it has several independent levels of
processing (see Figure 4), allowing us to determine
which level best accounts for a particular phenomenon.
In this case, we compute the similarity between two
faces at the pixel level (correlation between the raw
images), the perceptual level (correlation between the
Gabor filter responses), the gestalt level (correlation
between the principal components), or the categoriza-
tion level (correlation between the six outputs). We
compared our measure of discriminability with human
performance in Young et al.’s (1997) ABX experiment
(see Methods for details). We found the following
correlations at each processing level. Pixel: r = .35,
p = .06; perceptual: r = .52, p = .003; gestalt: r = .65,
p < .001 (shown in Figure 7b); category: r = .41, p = .02.
Crucially, when the gestalt layer and the categorization
layer were combined in a multiple regression, the cate-
gorization layer’s contribution was insignificant ( p = .3),
showing that the explanatory power of the model rests
with the gestalt layer. According to our model, then,
human subjects’ improved discrimination near category
boundaries in this task is best explained as an effect at
the level of gestalt-based representations, which were
derived in an unsupervised way from Gabor represen-
tations via PCA. This is in sharp contrast to the stand-
ard explanation of this increased sensitivity, which is
that categorization influences perception (Goldstone
et al., 2001; Pevtzow & Harnad, 1997). This suggests
that the facial expression morph sequences have natu-
ral boundaries, possibly because the endpoints are
extremes of certain coordinated muscle group move-
ments. In other domains, such as familiar face classi-
fication (Beale & Keil, 1995), the boundaries must arise
through learning. In such domains, we expect that
discrimination would be best explained in a learned
Figure 7. Discrimination of
morph stimuli. (a) Percent cor-
rect discrimination of pairs of
stimuli in an ABX task (Young
et al., 1997). Each point repre-
sents the percentage of time
subjects correctly discriminated
between two neighboring
morph stimuli. The x-axis labels
to the left and right of each
point show which two stimuli
were being compared; (e.g.,
70/90 along the transition from
sadness to disgust denotes a
comparison of a 70% disgust /
30% sadness morph with a 90%
disgust /10% sadness morph).
Note that better performance
occurs near category bound-
aries than near prototypes
( highlighted by the vertical
lines). ( b) The model’s discri-
mination performance at the
gestalt representation level.
The model discrimination
scores are highly correlated
with the human subjects’ scores
(r = .65, p < .001).
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feature layer, as in other models (Goldstone, 2000;
Tijsseling & Harnad, 1997).
The data above show that the model naturally
accounts for categorical behavior of humans making
forced-choice responses to facial expression morph
stimuli. In another experiment, Young et al. (1997)
found that subjects could reliably detect the expres-
sion mixed into a morph even at the 30% level. Can
the model also account for this decidedly noncategor-
ical behavior? In the experiment, subjects were asked
to decide, given a morph or prototype stimulus, the
most apparent emotion, the second-most apparent
emotion, and the third-most apparent emotion (the
scores on prototypes were used to normalize for inher-
ent expression similarity). To compare the human
responses with the model, we used the top three out-
puts of the 13 networks, and used the same analysis as
Young et al. to determine the extent to which the
network could detect the mixed-in expression in the
morph images (see Methods for details). Figure 8 shows
that the model’s average sensitivity to the mixed-in
expression is almost identical to that of human subjects,
even though its behavior seems categorical in forced-
choice experiments.
Comparison of Similarity Structures
We next investigated the similarity structure of the
representations that the model produced. As before,
we calculated the similarity between pairs of faces at
each level of the network by computing the correlation
between their representations. In order to evaluate the
similarity structure qualitatively, we performed MDS
both on the human forced-choice responses published
by Ekman and Friesen (1976) and on the network’s
responses to the same stimuli, at each level of pro-
cessing shown in Figure 4. At the pixel level, we found
that the structure present in the MDS configuration
was based mainly on identity, and as we moved toward
the categorization level, the identity-based structure
began to break down, and expression-related clusters
began to emerge. Unsurprisingly, at the network’s cat-
egorization layer, the configuration was clearly organ-
ized by emotion category (Figure 9). Of more interest,
however, is that the ‘‘ordering’’ of facial expressions
around the human and network MDS configurations
is the same, a result unlikely to have arisen by chance
Figure 9. Multidimensional scaling of human and network responses
reveals similar dimensions of emotion. Each point represents one of
the 96 expressive faces in POFA. (a) 2-D similarity space induced by
MDS from the average six-way forced-choice responses of human
subjects (Ekman & Friesen, 1976) (stress = 0.218). ( b) 2-D similarity
space induced by MDS from the average training set responses of
networks at their output layers (stress = 0.201). The arrangement of
emotions around the circle is the same in both cases. Stress at the pixel
level was 0.222, the perceptual level 0.245, and the gestalt level 0.286.
Figure 8. Ability to detect mixed-in expression in morph sequences,
for humans and the model. In the human data (dashed lines), subjects
chose the far prototype (the faint second expression in the morph)
significantly more often than unrelated expressions when that
expression’s mix ratio was 30% or greater, even though they
consistently identified the 70% expression in forced-choice experi-
ments. The model is almost identical to the humans in its ability to
detect the secondary expression in a morph image.
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( p = 1/60 = .017). Given that the network was never
given any similarity information, this is a remarkable
result. It suggests that the human similarity structure
is a simple result of the inherent confusability of the
categories, not necessarily the result of locality in some
underlying psychological emotion space, as dimen-
sional theories (e.g., Russell, 1980; Russell et al.,
1989) might predict.
To measure the similarity between the human and
network category structures quantitatively, we com-
pared the human and model confusion matrices directly.
For each pair of expressions, we computed the proba-
bility pij that humans or networks respond with emotion
i when the intended emotion is j for all i 6¼ j, that is, the
probability of confusion between two categories. The
correlation between networks and humans on the net-
works’ test sets (the stimuli the networks had never
seen before) was .661 ( p < .001).3 Thus, there is a close
correspondence between human confusion rates and
response distributions at the model’s categorization
level. The system is never instructed to confuse the
categories in a way similar to humans; nevertheless, this
property emerges naturally from the data.
DISCUSSION
In this article, we have introduced a computational
model that mimics some of the important functions of
the visual system. The model is simply a pattern classifier
incorporating a biologically plausible representation of
visual stimuli. We first engineered the system to provide
good classification performance on a small database of
reliably recognizable facial expressions. The free param-
eters of the model, such as the number of principal
components used in dimensionality reduction, were
optimized to maximize the classifier’s generalization
performance. In contrast to most models in mathemat-
ical psychology, which seek to fit a low number of free
parameters to maximize a model’s agreement with
human data, our model is compared to human data
directly without any tuning.
The results of our comparison of the model’s per-
formance with human data were nevertheless remark-
able. We first found that the relative levels of difficulty
for six basic facial expressions of emotion were highly
correlated with the levels at which humans agree on
those same emotions. For example, humans are best at
classifying happy expressions because the smile makes
the task easy. The network model likewise finds it
extremely easy to detect smiles because they are
obvious visual features that discriminate happy expres-
sions from the rest of the faces in its training set. On
the other hand, humans usually find that fear expres-
sions are very difficult to classify. Fear expressions are
often classified as surprise, for instance. The network
model likewise sometimes classifies fear expressions as
surprise. Why are fear expressions so difficult for
humans to classify? Could it be that true displays of
fear are uncommon in our society? Or that portrayals of
fear in the popular culture misguide us as to what
fearful people really look like? Or simply that fear
expressions are perceptually similar to other expres-
sions? Our results suggest that the latter is the case—
culture probably has very little to do with the difficulty
of fear expressions. We have shown that perceptual
similarity alone is sufficient to account for the relative
difficulty of facial expressions.
The agreement between human and network similar-
ity structure analyses (MDS) is also somewhat surprising.
As pointed out earlier, Russell and colleagues have found
that affective adjectives and affective facial expressions
seem to share a common similarity structure. One might
postulate that the underlying psychological space
reflects the physiological similarity of emotional states,
and that when we are asked to classify facial expressions,
we are likely to classify a given face as any of the
emotions close by in that psychophysiological space.
However, we have shown that an emotionless machine,
without any underlying physiology, exhibits a similarity
structure very much like that of the humans. This is even
more remarkable when one considers that the network
was not given any indication of the similarity structure in
the training signal, which was always all-or-none, rather
than, for example, human subject responses, which
would reflect subjects’ confusions. Since we nevertheless
match the human similarity structure, we have shown
that the perceptual similarity of the categories corre-
sponds to the psychological similarity structure of facial
expressions. Why would this be? We suggest that evolu-
tion did not randomly associate facial expressions with
emotional states, but that the expression-to-emotion
mapping evolved in tandem with the need to communi-
cate emotional states effectively.
The final question we set out to explore with this
work is whether facial expressions are represented
continuously or as discrete entities. As explained in
the Introduction, the best evidence for discrete repre-
sentations is that subjects appear to place sharp boun-
daries between facial expression categories and are
better able to discriminate pairs of expressions near
category boundaries, suggesting that our perception of
the faces is influenced by the existence of the catego-
ries. As has been found in other modalities (cf. Ellison
& Massaro, 1997), we find that it is unnecessary to
posit discrete representations to account for the sharp
boundaries and high discrimination scores. The net-
work model places boundaries between categories, as
it must to obtain good classification accuracy, but the
categories are actually fuzzy and overlapping. The
model can be thought of as a biologically plausible,
working implementation of Russell and Bullock’s
(1986) theory of emotional facial expression categories
as fuzzy concepts. Despite the network’s fuzzy, over-
lapping category concepts, the categories appear
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sharp when a rule such as ‘‘respond with the category
most strongly activated by the given facial expression’’
is applied. A more difficult result to explain in terms of
fuzzy categories placed in a continuous multidimen-
sional space is the subjects’ high discrimination scores
near category boundaries. This result seems to call for
an influence of the category boundaries on our per-
ception of the expressions; indeed, that is Young
et al.’s (1997) tentative interpretation. To the contrary,
we have shown that in our model, discrimination
scores best agree with human results at a purely per-
ceptual level, where the category labels have no effect.
With respect to image space, the low-dimensional PCA
representation actually changes faster in boundary
regions than in regions near the prototypes it derived
from. In the context of our model, then, the seemingly
contradictory results in different experiments con-
ducted by Young et al. can be explained as simply
tapping different computational levels of processing in
a visual system organized much like our model.
We have found that our facial expression recognition
model is ‘‘sufficient’’ to explain many aspects of human
performance in behavioral tasks, but we have no proof
of the ‘‘necessity’’ of any of our particular implementa-
tion decisions. In fact, we predict that many similar
systems would obtain similar results. For instance, a
system beginning with derivative-of-Gaussian edge filters
(Marr, 1982) whose responses are combined to produce
smooth responses to translations (like complex cells)
should exhibit the same behavior. Replacing the PCA
dimensionality reduction method with, say, factor anal-
ysis or the Infomax algorithm for independent compo-
nents analysis (Bell & Sejnowski, 1995) should not
dramatically affect the results. Finally, a category level
using Support Vector Machines (Vapnik, 1995) should
likewise produce similar behavior. The point of our
simulations is that the category boundaries, discrimina-
bility, and similarity structures previously seen as being
at odds are in a sense ‘‘present in the data and tasks




The first step of processing in the model is to filter the
image with a rigid 29 by 35 grid of overlapping 2-D Gabor
filters (Daugman, 1985) in quadrature pairs at five scales
and eight orientations (some example filters are shown
in Figure 5). The quadrature pairs are used to compute a
phase insensitive energy response at each point in the
grid. These linear energy responses, or ‘‘Gabor magni-
tudes,’’ are often used as a simplifying model of the
spatial responses of complex cells in the early visual
system (Lades et al., 1993). Though the model loses
some information about precise feature localization
when phase information is thrown away, the overlapping
receptive fields compensate for this loss (Hinton,
McClelland, & Rumelhart, 1986). Each Gabor magnitude
is z-scored (linearly transformed to have mean 0 and
variance 1 over the training data) so that each filter
contributes equally in the next representation layer.
The second step of processing in the model is
to perform linear dimensionality reduction on the
40,600-element Gabor representation via a PCA of the
training set. The actual computation is facilitated by
Turk and Pentland’s (1991) algebraic trick for ‘‘eigenfa-
ces.’’ This produces a 50-element representation typi-
cally accounting for approximately 80% of the variance
in the training set’s Gabor data.
The 50-element vector p output by PCA can then
be classified by a simple statistical model. We locally
z-score (scale to mean 0, variance 1) each input element
then use a single-layer neural network (a generalized
linear model) containing six outputs, one for each of the
six ‘‘basic’’ emotions happiness, sadness, fear, anger,
surprise, and disgust. Each of the six units in the
network computes a weighted sum oi =
P
jwijpj of
the 50-element input vector, then the ‘‘softmax’’ func-




oj is applied to the units’ linear
activations to obtain a vector of positive values whose
sum is 1.0. The network is trained with the relative
entropy error function so that its outputs correspond to
the posterior probabilities of the emotion categories
given the inputs (Bishop, 1995).
Network Training
We train the expression recognition system using leave-
one-out cross-validation and early stopping. A given
network is trained to minimize output error on all the
images of 12 of the 14 actors in POFA, using stochastic
gradient descent, momentum, weight decay, and the
relative entropy error function (Bishop, 1995). A thir-
teenth actor’s images are used as a ‘‘hold out’’ set to
determine when to stop training: Training is stopped
when the error on the hold out set is minimized. After
training is stopped, we evaluate the network’s general-
ization performance on the remaining (fourteenth)
actor. We performed training runs with every possible
combination of generalization and hold out sets, for a
total of 182 (14 by 13) individual networks.
Network Weight Visualization
The idea is to project each unit’s weight vector back into
image space in order to visualize what the network is
sensitive to in an image. But this is not a well-defined
task; though PCA is an easily inverted orthonormal
transformation, the Gabor magnitude representation,
besides being subsampled, throws away important
phase information. As a workaround, we assume that
each pixel’s value is an approximately linear function of
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the 50-component gestalt-level (Gabor + PCA) repre-
sentation. We chose one of the 192 trained networks,
and for each pixel location, we used regression to find
the linear function of the 50-element gestalt-level repre-
sentation best predicting the pixel’s value over the net-
work’s training set. Then to visualize, say, the classifier’s
representation of happiness, we apply the regression
function directly to happiness unit’s weights. An image
was constructed from each of the six units’ weight
vectors using the regression functions learned from that
network’s training set.
Generation of Morphs
We generated morphs from the original stimuli (Ekman
& Friesen, 1976) using the Morph program, version
2.5, from Gryphon Software, as described elsewhere
( Jansari, Tranel, & Adolphs, 2000). Briefly, for each of
the 15 pairs of expression prototypes, corresponding
features between the two images were manually
specified. The images were then tessellated and line-
arly transformed both with respect to pixel position
(a smooth warping) and pixel grayscale value
(a smooth fade in luminance). The 10%, 30%, 50%,
70%, and 90% blends (see Figure 1b for examples)
were retained for each transformation.
Multidimensional Scaling
MDS seeks to embed a set of stimuli in a low-dimen-
sional space in such a way that the distances between
points in the low-dimensional space are as faithful as
possible to ratings of their similarity (Borg & Lingoes,
1987). We performed MDS on the human responses
(Ekman & Friesen, 1976) and on the network’s
responses to the same stimuli, at each level of pro-
cessing in the network. Each analysis requires a dis-
tance (dissimilarity) matrix enumerating how dissimilar
each pair of stimuli is. For the human data, we formed
a six-element vector containing the probability with
which humans gave the labels happy, sad, afraid, angry,
surprised, and disgusted, for each of the 96 nonneutral
photographs in POFA. We obtained a 96 by 96 element
similarity matrix from these data by computing the
correlation rij between each pair of six-element vec-
tors. Finally, we converted the resulting similarity
matrix into a distance (dissimilarity) matrix with the
transform dij = (1  rij)/2 to obtain values in the
range 0–1. For the network, we measure the similarity
between two stimuli i and j as the correlation rij
between the representations of the two stimuli at each
level of the network, corresponding to similarity at
different levels of processing: the pixel level (70,080-
element image pixel value vectors), the perceptual
level (40,600-element Gabor response patterns), the
gestalt level (50-element Gabor/PCA patterns), and
the network’s output (six-element category level). We
ran a classical nonmetric MDS algorithm, SSA-1, due to
Guttman and Lingoes (Borg & Lingoes, 1987), on each
of the four resulting distance matrices described above
and then plotted the stimuli according to their posi-
tion in the resulting 2-D configuration.
Model RTs
We assume a network’s RT is directly proportional to the
‘‘uncertainty of its maximal output.’’ That is, we define
a network’s model RT for stimulus i to be ti
model =
1  maxj yij (the time scale is arbitrary). Here yij is the
network’s output for emotion j on stimulus i. This is
similar to the standard approach of equating RT with a
network’s output error (Seidenberg & McClelland,
1989), except that for morph stimuli, there is no
predetermined ‘‘correct’’ response. For comparison,
the human data available are tij
human, the mean RT of
subjects responding with emotion j to stimulus i. To
compare the model to the humans, given these data,
we treated each network as an individual subject, and
for each morph stimulus, recorded the network’s
response emotion j and model reaction time ti
model
then averaged ti
model over all networks making the
same response to the stimulus. The quantitative com-
parison is the linear fit between network predictions
and human RTs for all stimuli and response pairs for
which both human and network data were available.
Young et al.’s criterion for reporting tij
human was that at
least 25% of the human subjects responded with
emotion j to stimulus i, and for some of these cases,
none of the networks responded with emotion j to
stimulus i, so the missing human and network data
were disregarded.
Model Discrimination Scores
We assume discrimination is more difficult the more
similar two stimuli are at some level of processing. We
use the same measure of similarity as in the MDS
procedure: The correlation rij between the network’s
representation of stimuli i and j (either at the pixel,
perceptual, gestalt, or output level). To convert similar-
ity scores to discrimination scores, we used the trans-
form dij = 1  rij. This was measured for each of the 30
pairs of J. J. images for which human data were available.
The discrimination scores were then averaged over the
13 networks that had not been trained on J. J. and
compared to the human data.
Mixed-in Expression Detection
To measure the ability of the model to detect the
secondary expression mixed into a morph stimulus, we
followed Young et al.’s (1997) methods. For each
network’s output on a given stimulus, we scored the
first, second, and third highest outputs of the networks
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as a 3, 2, and 1, respectively, and assigned the score 0 to
the three remaining outputs. For each morph and
prototype stimulus, we averaged these score vectors
across all 13 networks. Now for each of the 30 possible
combinations of near prototype (i) and far prototype
( j ), using the 90%, 70%, and 50% morphs moving from
expression i to expression j, we subtracted the score
vector for prototype i from the score for each of the
three morphs. This eliminates the effect of the intrinsic
similarity between J. J.’s prototype expressions. Now,
averaging these score vectors across all 30 sequences,
we obtain the data plotted in Figure 8.
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Notes
1. For comparison, the order of difficulty for the Calder et al.
(2001) PCA model is happiness (98%), fear (97%), surprise
(92%), anger (86%), sadness (72%), and disgust (72%).
2. We used 13 networks for technical reasons (see Methods
for details).
3. The same comparison of our model with the confusion
matrix from the Calder et al. (2001) forced-choice experiment
is slightly better, .686, whereas their PCA model’s correlation
with their subjects’ confusion data is somewhat lower, .496.
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